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This communication offers to look at recent instances of alternative communications networks –
namely two Internet community networks that emerged in the 1990's in France and Great Britain –
to draw lessons for similar contemporary initiatives. Highlighting the change of technical paradigm
brought about by the Internet and revolutionary tones that it entailed, we first consider the case of
the French Data Network (FDN). Founded in 1992 and still in operation, FDN was the first Internet
access provider available to the general public. It navigated the regulatory changes in the telecom
sector by becoming increasingly tied to the emerging digital rights movement and contributing to
the emergence of “critical Internet user” (Paloque-Bergès, 2015). Second, we turn to Consume.net,
a  British organization associated with the London counter-cultural  scene.  From 1999 to 20003,
Consume.net took advantage of the new WiFi protocols to subvert incumbent telecom operators’
hold on last-mile networks and promote a grassroots and locally-grounded approach of building and
managing “wide area” networks (Medosch, 2014). 
Based on existing literature, interviews with the founders of these initiatives as well as content and
policy analysis,  these two case-studies hold important  lessons for today's  community networks.
While  they  confirm  that  community  networks  can  emerge  from  diverse  actors,  with  different
motivations, political cultures as well as technical models and pricing schemes, they also show that
these initiatives face two major challenges to ensure their sustainability: the articulation of the local
and  global  scales  in  connectivity  needs,  and  the  need  to  build  advocacy  capabilities  aimed  at
influencing regulatory developments. 
1. Birth, Downs and Ups of the French Data Network
At the end of the 1970s, personal computers were finally coming to France. Magazines specialized
in computer cultures reported at the time that more than 100,000 machines had been sold in France
(Thierry,  2012, p.  55).  In 1985, an official  report  claimed that 860,000 households possessed a
desktop device. And by the end of the decade, France would become the first European market for
PCs. Over that period, the number of computer clubs also rose significantly. 
This  rise  of  computer  penetration  and  its  growing  use  was  significantly  facilitated  by  the
government’s voluntarist approach. In 1978, when France was still lagging behind, the Nora-Minc
report called on the coming together of computers and telephone networks and would launch the
unique experience of the Minitel (Gonzalez & Jouve, 2002). First intended as a way of granting to
the public access to database, it would morph into a large-scale social experiment to turn it into a
communication device, with the creation of France’s earliest virtual communities. At the end of the
1980’s, a quarter of French residents had access to the Minitel. Though less popular, other computer
networks were also accessible through dial-up connections, such as Calvacom, launched by Apple,
and the American College in Paris. 
All of these early experiences of popular computer culture, with their novices and “enlightened
amateurs”, formed the background against which the Internet would sweep the country. In 1992, the
Cold War officially came to an end at Camp David and, as Request for Comments 1366 underlined
in October of that year (Gerich, 1992), the Internet was undergoing such a “growth and increasing
globalization” that it would soon result in a historical democratization of communications. But in
December of 1992, the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement formed part  of a
mounting wave of neoliberal commodification which would soon profoundly alter the Internet's
political economy.
1992 was also the founding year of the first French citizen-owned Internet access provider, French
Data Network (FDN). FDN was not only first French CN, but also the very first Internet access
provider open to the general public – one that has survived to this day. Based on interviews with
FDN’s founders and leaders, this case-study retraces its success and failures in navigating an ever-
changing techno-legal regulatory environment, and its increasing politicization. This case suggests
the inscription of CNs in a  wide advocacy movement – in this  case the French Digital  Rights
movement  –  facilitates  the  political  framing  of  a  CN  and  leads  to  positive  cross-fertilization
between advocacy on the one hand and the development of alternative architecture on the other. It
also shows the need for community networks to first and foremost respond to the basic connectivity
needs of its members.
1.1 The Birth of a “Crazy Idea”: The Foundation of FDN
FDN was founded by Christian Paulus and a few of his friends, including Jean-Philippe Nicaise,
whom he  had met  in  the  first  French  online  communities  and  in  the  rising  Parisian  scene  of
computer enthusiasts. They had been exploring closed RTC networks like the Minitel, Calvacom, as
well  as  the  more  open  Usenet  since  the  mid-1980s.  In  these  “virtual  communities,”  a  lot  of
educational material and knowledge-sharing could be found. To them, these networks looked like a
fantastic alternative to schools, giving people access to information they wouldn't be able to access
otherwise, especially on Usenet (Paulus, 2016). The difference with closed computer networks like
the French Minitel was clear, and the diversity and richness of content far greater in these open
spaces.
But “joining in” these RTC networks was still a great challenge. At the turn of the decade, retrieving
information  from  Usenet  newsgroups  over  the  UUCP protocol and  exchange  emails  was  still
terribly  long  and  expensive.  Accessing  these  proto-Internet  was  a  privilege  reserved  to  those
working in research and academic institutions. Some early commercial Internet service providers
existed but their pricing models made them only accessible to a few businesses and to the rich.
Some had managed to “hack” the Minitel by creating gateway services to other computer networks,
but these services remained very confidential.
In February 1992, Paulus and his friends decided to move forward with a bold plan they had been
pondering  with  for  a  few  weeks  (Paulus,  2016;  Nicaise,  2016).  Tired  of  waiting  for  public
institutions  and the few private  companies operating closed computer networks to  change their
model to become more accessible, they decided to bypass them altogether. Their “crazy idea”, as
they called it at the time, was to create an access provider that would directly connect to North
American servers where most of Usenet traffic was originated to carry it to their members. On
February  12th,  the  clique  met  in  a  bar.  Wanting  to  “open  this  emerging  worldwide  library  to
everybody,”  they  decided  to  fund  a  non-profit  under  the  1901  French  law on  the  freedom of
association.
In May of that year, even before the organization was formerly created, they contacted UUNET, the
U.S. service provider, to join the UUCP and SMTP crowd. And the next month, the French Data
Network was formally created, with Paulus acting as the non-profit's director, and Jean-Philippe
Nicaise as its treasurer.
The response among the early crowd of French computer-savvy people was immediate. Within two
years, the number of member-subscribers across the country rose to 400, including about thirty for-
profit and non-profit organizations who acted as proxies for their members. To communicate on
UUCP and  exchange  emails  on  SMTP,  they  needed  to  subscribe  to  the  incumbent  telephone
operators France Télécom, own microcomputers equipped with a modem and loaded with a UUCP
free software like FreeBSD or NetBSD. Each of them paid an annual membership fee of 100 francs
(15 euros) and a monthly flat-rate subscription of 180 francs for their dial-up connection with a
generous data allowance. 
The hub of FDN was located in Paulus'  living room in Paris, and was formed by three NEXT
computers  and  their  attached  UUCP modems,  through  which  members  would  connect  to  the
worldwide (mostly North-American) UUCP network. providing users with their own IP addresses,
configurable  email  services.  FDN  also  ran  a  file-sharing  server  from  which  members  could
download  free  software  to  manage  their  modem  and  configure  their  connection.  The  FDN
community contributed to that software by writing bits of code, and translated English technical
documentation and tutorials to make them more accessible to a French audience. Paulus even got
national  visibility  among  French  Internet  pioneers  by  making  a  translation  of  the  Netiquette.
Overall, things were operating smoothly, revenues were much better than expected and did more
than cover for the expenses.
Soon, another opportunity arose. RENATER, the public state-owned national network for academic
and research institutions, started promoting the promising Internet among the French educational
and research world (see Schafer & Tuy, 2013). In his professional capacity, Nicaise was invited to
join, and realized that RENATER was offering to subsidized Internet connectivity. So FDN took the
offer. It reached out to RENATER later that year, highlighting their educational focus and the fact
that their special prices for students and job-seekers. Within a couple of month, RENATER happily
gave, for a symbolic price, FDN a special line of 64 kilobits/second to their data center open on the
worldwide Internet, a CISCO router, a first batch of public IP addresses to connect their servers to
the Net, as well as its FDN.fr domain name. The team was ecstatic and, around March 1993 after
some engineering work, the new infrastructure was up and running, still on UUCP. Later that year,
FDN moved from UUCP modem connection to IP connections and was able to offer real Internet
access, allowing to connect directly to any IP server of the global Internet.
1.2 The Emergence of Digital Rights Activism in France
By 1995, FDN's cofounders had moved to other adventures and were busy developing their careers
in  the  booming  tech  sector  (today,  one  of  them currently  works  at  France  Télécom's Orange,
another  moved  to  California  soon  after  the  launch  of  FDN is  now  director  of  engineering  at
Google). In late 1997, FDN members elected a new young president named Benjamin Bayart and
open a new period in the history of the organization.
In the second half of the 1990s, EU policies forced incumbent network operators to open up their
legacy infrastructure to small and innovative ISPs. In a context of rapid privatization, regulation
promoted both the unbundling of last-mile as well as facility-based competition and new companies
began laying down their own network infrastructure (Michalis & Ruhle, 2001). This, along with the
explosion of mobile telephony and the democratization of Internet access, made liberalization look
like a success story: innovation in telecom services was dynamic and fast-paced, prices were low,
and the number of Internet users surged.
In this  context,  the mid-1990s as an era  of “renaissance” for what  Stefania Milan (2013) calls
“emancipatory communication practices.” Echoing the pirate radio movement of the late 1970s and
1980s, the Internet sparked a political movement of tech activists whose aim was “to bypass the
politics of enclosure and control enacted by states and corporations” on the public sphere. They
wanted to achieve a “structural reform at the grassroots level through the creation of autonomous
spaces of communication. By emancipating other social actors from commercial communication
services, they aimed to empower them to articulate, voice and convey their own messages without
filters” (p. 10).
In  France,  this  crowd  of  early  Internet  activists  worked  to  provide  Workers  Unions  and
organizations involved in the Global Justice Movement with secure e-mailing, free hosting services,
as well as innovative web-publishing tools ( Granjon & Torrès, 2012; Papatheorodou, 2005). This
led to forms of cross-fertilization: these new links helped to politicize these techies, while they also
educated these older citizen organizations about what they saw as the Internet's original ethos and
governance model: a network of equal peers communicating freely on a decentralized, end-to-end
architecture, exerting bottom-up control on the tools used for communicating, in particular through
free software. Most of these organization has the same non-profit status as FDN. To some extent,
FDN had pioneered a model for citizen autonomous infrastructure in the digital era.
But  the  democratization  of  Internet  access  also  entailed  less  rosy  consequences,  such  as  the
development  of  e-commerce  and  online  advertising.  What  is  more,  still  in  1996,  the  French
government  initiated  its  first  regulatory  crackdown  to  boost  its  censorship  and  surveillance
capabilities, in a context where the media contributed to the demonization of this new online public
sphere.  These trends added to the widespread feeling among the crowd of online pioneers that
something nascent and beautiful was about to get dirtied by the old and corrupt world of money and
politics, and which led to the creation in 1996 of the Association des Utilisateurs d'Internet (AUI) –
the first French organization aimed at defending the civil rights of Internet users (Chemla & Bayart,
2016).
At first, FDN may have been one of the few ways by which it was possible to join the Internet.
Within a few years however, partly thanks to FDN's new president, the non-profit became loosely
connected to this emerging scene of Internet activists. For FDN's active volunteers, this citizen-
owned and run Internet  service provider  seemed to be a  natural  avenue for  resisting the  trend
towards  commodification  and  political  control  over  this  communications  architecture  (Bayart,
2016).  Through  the  leading  members  of  the  emerging  digital  rights  scene  did  not  necessarily
perceived FDN's political potential, all shared the goal of equipping newcomers with the technical
know-how and to cultivate an understanding of the Internet's political importance, allowing for the
emergence of a “critical Internet user” (Paloque-Bergès, 2015).
1.3 Maintaining Technological Relevance: A Condition for Political Efficacy
But FDN had more pressing challenges than joining the fights for civil rights online. The more
pressing question was how to maintain FDN's core activity, i.e. the provision of Internet access. To
connect its network to the global Internet, it soon had to switch. Like fiscal authorities around the
same time, RENATER decided that FDN was actually operating a commercial service and decline
to continue dealing with the non-profit.  FDN therefore switched from RENATER to Oléane,  a
business-to-business telecom operator who also provided batches of IP addresses.
Keeping pace  with commercial  providers  proved challenging.  And so  with take-off  of  Internet
access markets from 1996 on, a sizable portion of FDN members – around 10% of members in 1996
alone – left  the group to join commercial  alternatives that provided faster and cheaper Internet
access,  even  though  the  later  often  replicated  the  walled-gardens  and  deprived  users  from the
technical control over their communications (Rebillard, 2012). On the one hand, that meant that
those who stayed were the most committed. On the other, FDN's user base was decreasing. Like it
would later be the case for other Web-based services used by activists (Uldam & Askanius, 2011),
community networks were among the first of many services and tools of the early Internet to face –
and suffer from – a wave of commodification.
What  is  more,  the  new regulatory  framework created  a  set  of  new hurdles  for  FDN. First  the
European  directives  that  deregulated  telecom  markets  led  to  a  the  imposition  of  a  new  legal
definition for telecom operators, as well as new obligations. To be registered, FDN had to pay an
annual registration fee of about 20 000 euros to the newly created national regulatory authority. The
fee was designed for commercial players, and for FDN it was of the same order of magnitude as its
revenues. To avoid this crushing financial burden, FDN declined to register and chose to remain
under the radar (Bayart, 2016). Other alternative networks could not, like some small and medium
businesses providing Internet access and which were not able to survive under these conditions.
Around 2005, when speeds increased by orders of magnitudes thanks to the deployment of ADSL
technologies, the situation worsens. By that time, FDN had only 40 member subscribers,  all of
which kept using their slow FDN access only for very simple and old applications. The bulk of their
Internet use relied on mainstream access providers.
To remain relevant in this new technological paradigm, FDN had to upgrade its infrastructure and
move to ADSL as well. In theory, EU directives forced France Télécom, the incumbent, to open its
networks to competitors, but in practice its pricing model made it way too expensive for a player
such as FDN which was expected to invest tens of thousands of euros in the last-mile portions of the
networks  where  it  had  subscribers.  Fortunately,  Benjamin  Bayart  knew  very  well  how  ADSL
worked. Since 2003, he had been working at a mainstream operator on this technology, setting up
their ADSL system (Bayart, 2016). After 18 months of doing some internal lobbying, of finding and
talking to the right people, he managed to find someone in the business department who was ready
to lease parts of its network to FDN through what are called “bitstream offers”. Rather than having
to deploy its own infrastructure in the last-mile networks, FDN could rely on that on this much
bigger operator in exchange of a per-subscriber fee. So in 2005, FDN was back in the game at the
technical level and was again recruiting new members.
Under these new conditions, time would soon be ripe for a revival of FDN. Understanding what
drove this movement remains a question to be investigated. But to be sure, evolutions in Internet
politics – namely the increasing concentration in telecom markets, the prominence of US-based
online services and the vertical integration strategies of telecom firms moving into the media sector,
the growing debate around online copyright – gave a new impulse around Internet policy issues,
such as network neutrality, online censorship and surveillance.
In 2007, Bayart  became more politically  involved, addressing crowds of free software activists
during  public  events.  In  one  famous  conference  that  gathered  much  viewership  online,  Bayart
described the Internet’s enclosure and growing centralization as a move towards a “Minitel 2.0”.
This conference stroke a chord in an activist milieu that was getting increasingly politicized. A year
later, a new digital rights advocacy group, La Quadrature du Net (LQDN), was founded in France
by Free Software activists to occupy the political space that had been left vacant by the end of the
AUI and other similar groups around 2002, with Bayart originally acting as LQDN’s treasurer.
Soon, coupled with the growing ability of a better-resourced digital rights movement to frame these
issues at the political level, Bayart's advocacy in favor of non-profit Internet access providers led to
a revival  of the burst  of movement a community networks across France.  In 2010-2011, many
events impacting the digital rights debate and FDN leaders played a role in them. Such was the case
during WikiLeaks Cablegate, where FDN created a mirror site of WikiLeaks and helped channel
donations to Julian Assange’s organization to circumvent the banking blockade it was subjected to.
During the Arab Spring, FDN set up modems and share numbers to allow Egyptian protesters to
connect to the Internet through dial-up connections during the Internet shutdown, and partnered
with  Reporters  Without  Borders  to  provide  VPN  services  to  political  dissidents.  Echoing  the
glorious  times  of  the  Free  Radio  Movement,  FDN formed part  of  a  global  crowd of  activists
resorting  to  decentralization  and  creative  networking  to  help  others  circumvent  the  repressive
policies of state authorities.
This was the moment when Bayart and other FDN active volunteers went on to motivate people
across France to join and start  building their  own community networks. Rather than growing a
single  organization,  or  even  the  handful  of  other  community  networks  already  existing  across
France at the time, the choice was made to “swarm” in a decentralized mode by creating many local
non-profit organizations, all under the French 1901 law on the freedom of association.
To  coordinate  these  developments,  share  expertise  and  organize  the  legal  and  political
representation  of  the  movement,  an  umbrella  non-profit  organization  was  also  created:  The
Fédération  FDN (or  FFDN).  Today,  FDN  has  500  members,  300  of  which  are  also  ADSL
subscribers. As for the Federation,  it  is now comprised of 29 local community networks across
France operating in both rural and urban areas, using both wireless and leased landline networks,
and whose combined number of subscribers is around 2500.
Today,  important  synergies  are  being  developed  between  FFDN  members,  who  enjoy  a  local
foothold and have a real expertise in telecom matters, and advocacy groups like La Quadrature du
Net. For French community networks, this cross-fertilization holds the promise of increasing their
influence on regulatory matters at the French and European levels, better understand their legal
environment and be able to engage in strategic litigation (FDN and FFDN have worked with  La
Quadrature du Net since 2015 to litigate against Internet censorship and surveillance, but has yet to
litigate  in  matters  more  closely  related  to  telecom  policy).  This  in  turn,  will  help  create  the
regulatory conditions favoring the values of communicational autonomy that it holds dear (i.e. on
issues such as data retention or Net neutrality).
2. Internet on the Airwaves: The History of Consume.net
In  1984,  that  is  twelve  years  before  France  privatized  its  own legacy  networks,  the  Thatcher
government  sold  some  of  the  Crown's  jewels  by  passing  the  Telecommunications  Act  and
privatizing  British  Telecom.  Neoliberalism was  sweeping  the  country,  and  would  take  with  it
another British legacy, the left-wing Labour Party. In the 1990s, as neoliberal policies spread to the
whole world, Tony Blair joined the frenzy. Successfully, he offered voters a third way between
social-democratic and conservative politics. But in the U.K. as elsewhere, this foreclosure of the
institutional political scene was contested by the new emerging and transnational Global Justice
Movement, which pioneered many activist uses of the Internet.
In late summer 1999, two British artist-designers – James Stevens and Julian Priest, each in their
early thirties – came up with their own “crazy idea” for a citizen network. The pair had met at
Backspace, a hub for artists, designers and entrepreneurs that would likely be branded today as a
hackerspace. Backspace had been founded in 1996 and for the three years of its existence acted as a
cultural hub on Clink Street, on the banks of the Thames next to the London Bridge. Although its
protagonists were not trained as engineers, nor did they identified as “techies.” But they had an
understanding of the Internet's potential for alternativeness. As James Stevens recalls, at Backspace
“the spirit of free networking and collaboration spawned by its passing lives on in the flow of
activity  and passion for  [self-publishing platform] IndyMedia and peer-oriented exchange […]”
(Garrett, 2006;  Coleman, 2005).
At first, the project was about sharing a connection and laying out a fiber optic cable between a
higher floor of Backspace and the building across the street. But they realized that old planning
laws forbade the deployment of a telecom cable in a public space to entities that were not registered
as “public telecom operators” (under the 1984 Telecom Act). Thankfully, around the same time, a
new  networking  technology  was  appearing:  Wireless  Local  Access  Network  (WLAN)  and  a
protocol numbered 802.11b – the underlying technologies of WiFi.
Active  between  1999  and  2003,  Consume  would  soon  confirm  that  technical  and  regulatory
innovations  – in  this  case the  opening up of  new frequency bands to  unlicensed use for  WiFi
communications – can significantly alter the political economy of communications network and
favor the development of alternative networks.
2.1 Building a Network and a Community on Thin Air
Now, Apple was advertising its new Airport device. Since the 1984 restrictions on public networks
did not apply to radio transmissions, Stevens and Priest had found a way to circumvent the law to
share Internet access. Soon, they realized that they could do much more than that. As James Stevens
would tell CNN three years later, “anyone with a little techie knowledge can buy a simple base
station for just few hundred pounds which acts as the co-coordinator for a wireless network.” He
continued: “Then any user wanting to access this needs a card that links your laptop to the network
which can be bought for as little as 100 euros” (Heikkila, 2002).
Because it was using the unlicensed 2,4Ghz band, WiFi “could be thought of as the networking
equivalent of CB radio” claimed Consume's founders. It allowed for the building of an autonomous
network where  individuals,  groups  or  organizations  would  relay  Internet  traffic  to  one another
through their antennas. Functioning as a free, open local network, Consume could relay traffic to
the global Internet through its members who had their own connection at mainstream ISPs and were
willing  to  share  these  gateways.  In  that  way,  the  network  would  “re-distribute  access”  while
“promoting common ownership” of the network (Priest, 2000).
WiFi had another advantage: Although it was certainly the easiest configuration to put in place, the
network did not need any fixed routing table between the nodes of the networks (antennas and
attached access points). The protocol theoretically allowed for ad hoc reconfiguration, based on the
location of new nodes. Thanks to mesh, a longer term project was made possible: the possibility of
a flexible, self-configuring and resilient network was on the horizon, one that would grow along
with the number of people and device willing to join in. The technology was not mature enough at
the time (it barely is today), but the idea of grassroots networks based on mesh was already there.
The framing of the political potential of Consume was also linked to the idea of local network,
against  the  global  gigantism of  the Internet.  According to  a  WiFi  activist  quoted  in  2002 in a
Guardian article, "the real power of these networks will be manifest when local nodes connect to
one  another,  so  rather  than  offering  isolated  local  gateways  to  the  Internet,  they  provide  an
alternative public network for local communities (Mortleman, 2002).
For Armin Medosch (2014), a protagonist and prescient analyst of wireless community networks,
Stevens and Priest understood Consume.net as “a techno-social system from the very start”: “Their
ideas combined aspects of social and technological self-organization. In tech-speak, the network
they aimed at instigating was supposed to become a Wide Area Network (WAN). But while such
large infrastructural projects are usually either built by the state or by large corporations, James and
Julian thought that this could be achieved by bottom-up forms of organic growth […] Individual
node owners would set up wireless network nodes on rooftops, balconies and window sills. Each
node would be owned and maintained by its owner, who would also define the rules of engagement
with other nodes.  The network would grow as a  result  of the combination of social  and urban
topologies.”
After a few weeks and months of trial and error with the help of skilled hackers, Stevens and Priest
managed to created a local network involving dozens of participating organizations and individuals.
In 2002, a Guardian journalist would describe his own experience in setting up his wireless node in
these terms:
“Setting up a wireless access point for your street is less trouble than you might think. It
requires an old PC (a 486 or better, so I mean "really" old), a couple of network cards – one
wireless – and some patience. The Consume.net people can show you how, as can the many
community  wireless  organizations  around  the  world.  I  had  some old  equipment  hanging
around, and it's great to put it to some use. All I then had to do was point the antenna out of
the window in the direction of a comfortable spot,  drop leaflets  through the doors of my
neighbors and register myself on the Consume database. It was from the Consume database
that I had my first visitor. Seeing a flickering light on my network hub, I knew someone was
using it. It was Doc Searls, co-author of the Cluetrain Manifesto and top U.S. blogger, who is
in Britain for a few days. "The Revolution is on, People!" he was to write later that day, "I
haven't felt this jazzed and with-it since the Sixties."  Since then, he and many others have
used the spare bandwidth on my internet connection” (Hammersley, 2002).
Although there was no prior art or knowledge on which to rely, it was not the only such endeavor.
Also in 1999, Adam Burns and others independently launched Free2Air to provide a radio backbone
between different artistic hotspots across London. The idea of “free networks” was in the air, and
Consume helped gave it the political framing that made it more salient. Soon, dozens of similar
local initiatives spread across the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe. The know-how on how
to create local radio networks was fast spreading, these groups' techies were busy refining methods
for  dynamic  routing  as  well  as  free  hardware-software  tools.  Meanwhile,  the  media  attention
devolved to the WiFi grassroots revolution was growing.
2.2 Advocating for Free Networks Against the Incumbent
Consume.net  did  not  have  nor  need  any  bylaws,  only  a  mailing-list.  It  was  all  about  self-
organization. Thanks to radio, the goal was to restore the fantasied original promise of a bottom-up
communication platform. This was the time of the dotcom bubble,  and telecom operators were
rushing  to  reap  these  new  markets,  Consume  aimed  to  go  against  the  trend  of  the  Internet
commodification. It was entitled self financed by its users, and although one foundation approached
the group with a very generous proposal to launch the project on a bigger scale, the fact that the
group  was  not  incorporated  prevented  the  founders  from  even  seriously  considering  the  offer
(incorporation, even as a nonprofit, was apparently out of the question).
Contrary to other early community networks, the motives of Consume.net and the other similar
initiatives  to  which it  was  connected  were political  from the  start.  And there was at  least  one
common adversary:  the  incumbent  operator  British Telecom (BT).  Consume.net.  For  them, the
Internet  was democratizing access  to  communications  in  ways never  seen  before,  but  all  these
promises were being held back because of the market structure of the telecom markets where the
monopoly  of  BT on last-mile  networks  stifled  competition.  There  were  alternative  commercial
Internet access providers, but there were dependent on BT's infrastructure. BT's pricing model was
still based on per-minute billing, which meant that it had no incentive to invest in faster speeds, and
in particular in the development of ADSL. Quite clearly, slower speeds meant more time loading
web pages and sharing files, which meant more money for the incumbent.
Against this backdrop, Consume.net was about “defining a sustainable network development” by
circumventing BT's last mile copper infrastructure. The state aims was therefore to build WiFi radio
links  to  “optimize  infrastructural  expenditure”  and  “increase  network  speed.”  Eventually,  by
recruiting enough participants, Consume.net would come to represent significant traffic and become
large  enough  to  exchange  traffic  on  fairer  terms  with  other  networks,  therefore  “reducing
connectivity costs” for all participants.
Stevens explains that around that time, BT even lobbied to extend the 1984 rule regulating the
deployment  of  wired  infrastructure  across  the  public  realm  to  wireless  transmission.  This  led
Consume  and  other  free  networks  activists  to  work  with  Campaign  for  Unmetered
Telecommunications (CUT). Founded in 1998, this pressure group was advocating against the per-
minute billing model which was still dominant in Europe at the end of the 1990s, and boasted 300
members as well as several corporate supporters like AOL, UK and Intel.
In June 1999, they had taken part in a EU-wide 24-hour-long boycott of the Web. The organizers
called for the introduction of the flat-rate schemes for local calls – which was by then the dominant
model in the U.S. and played a significant role in the take up on Internet connectivity and the
development  of  online  services.  According to  them,  Internet  users  [should]  dial  up  to  Internet
Service Providers using a telephone modem, without worrying about the clock ticking and charges
ratcheting up.” Looking forward, they also asked for the “quicker introduction of modern access
methods such as xDSL, cable modems and satellite access, which do not use the telephone modem
and are a great improvement on it for users.” Their campaign had been effective in accelerating the
spread of flat-rate schemes.  Before CUT dissolved in 2001, one of their  last  stunt was to help
Consume activists fight BT to reach out to policy-makers and telecom regulators to ensure that
WiFi sharing would remain legal for citizens (Ziya, 1999).
These contacts were successful to the extent that wireless CNs were not outlawed or suffered new
regulatory restrictions. It created a contact channel between Consume's activists and policy-makers.
In  rural  areas  where  proper  infrastructure  was  crucially  lacking,  local  groups  replicating  the
Consume model also negotiated with local city councils.
1.3 Consume.net's Legacy and Internationalization
The Consume.net experiments, and many other similar initiatives, slowly ended in the course of
2003, as the main organizers' changing interests pushed them to move on to other projects. Some
launched commercial ventures around WiFi (looking back, Stevens speaks of the “self co-optation”
of his fellow free networkers). Others joined other civil society groups keen on pushing the Blair
government to deliver on its promise to bring broadband access to towns and villages across the
U.K., and in 2003 started the Access to Broadband Campaign with people from CUT. Others started
spin-offs like Community Wireless Network, a group of community organizations teaming up with
small local access providers to resolve connectivity issues in rural areas.
Today, the British landscape for community networks has lost much of its vivacity. In part, it is due
to the fact that it is the very idea of grassroots open WiFi that has been co-opted by big players, for
instance  with  BT's  Openzone  network  of  WiFi  hotspots,  or  more  simply  out-competed  by the
development of triple-play offers and high-speed mobile connectivity with 3G and 4G, which have
created the incentives for people to pay for individual subscriptions rather than cooperating to share
their gateaways to the Internet.
Interestingly, it is beyond British borders that Consume's legacy is the most enduring. Two of the
most dynamic and large-scale community network in the world are Freifunk and Guifi, in Germany
and  Spain  respectively.  Their  outbreak  in  the  early  and  mid-2000s  was  directly  influenced  by
Consume.  In  2002,  Consume  people  and  their  connections  in  Berlin  organized  the  BerLon
conference,  bringing together people from Consume and local Berlin groups interested in  WiFi
technologies.  “BerLon  provided  the  contact  zone  between  Berlin  and  London,”  says  Medosch
(2014), who took part in the event. “This set into motion a process which would eventually lead to a
large and successful community network movement.” BerLon marked the birth of Freifunk which
todays  boasts  around  45,000  open  access  points  across  Germany.  Later  still,  this  nascent
transnational network of WiFi activists helped Guifi's founders put up their first wireless nodes in
rural Catalonia.
3. Conclusion: Reflecting on the First Generation of Community 
Networks
In this conclusive section, we aim to draw lessons on the first generation of community networks by
comparing  FDN  and  Consume.net.  We  address  recurring  themes  in  the  history  of  alternative
networks, namely the diversity of motivations and pricing models, the issue of geographic scope
with the challenge of scaling from the local to the global, and finally the importance of political
advocacy as a core component of the sustainability of CNs.
3.1 Diversity of Motivations and Pricing Models
Like with  other  alternative  networks  across  history,  one of  the  first  striking  observation  is  the
diversity of model in Internet community networks. In this respect, there is nothing new. On the one
hand, we find FDN, founded by IT specialists and computer experts coming out of middle class
families and – for some of them at least – educated in France’s top elite engineering schools. During
FDN’s founding years, its core volunteers are all white and males, whose motivation was to run
their own ISP when no other existed and reduce the price of joining this new online world. They
would go on to pursue their careers in the booming tech sector, and for some of them at least, in
some of its  most  infamous multinationals.  Though it  apparently did not  boast  great  ethnic and
cultural  diversity,  Consume.net  had a much more alternative ethos: It  was founded by counter-
cultural artists whose understanding of decentralization and flat organizational structures matched
the possibilities offered by new radio technologies at the turn of the second millennium. 
The techno-legal governance of both organizations reflects  these differences in motivations and
ideologies. FDN had to rely on the leased landline infrastructures of major telecom operators and
never developed an interest in WiFi technologies (to the difference of other, more recent French
community  networks),  and  would  even  pioneer  flat-rate  pricing  models  which  would  later  be
adopted by major market actors. It was incorporated as a non-profit under the French law on the
freedom of association and, when doing so was possible, it favored the possibility of being legally
recognized  as  a  Internet  access  provider  by  regulatory  authorities.  The  market  and  regulatory
constraints drove its growing politicization. Consume.net on the other hand, was very political from
the beginning and sought to use the spectrum commons to bypass almost entirely market actors. It
had no bylaws and no pricing scheme: It was based on an almost anarchic ethos whereby people
would  freely  contribute  bandwidth  and  equipment.  Here,  it  seems  that  market  and  regulatory
constraints drew a lot of energy from the group, which seem to have play a role in what Stevens
(2016)  calls  the  “self  co-optation”  of  its  most  active  participants,  rather  than  sharpening  their
collective political engagement. Thankfully, despite fundamental differences, both models have had
enduring legacies. 
3.2 The Stake of Networking Costs, From the Local to the Global
Another striking difference between these two early CNs is their difference of focus in scale and
geographic reach. FDN essentially started as an effort of mutualization aimed at lowering the cost
of accessing traffic originated in the US. From the beginning, relying on the national infrastructures
of  incumbent  operators  (at  first  the telephone network),  it  was – and still  is  – accessible  on a
national basis. In a way, it was a national effort aimed at bridging the gap between national legacy
networks and the emerging global online world.
Consume.net, on the other hand, brought a major innovation to Internet politics by framing local
Internet networks as the right level to organize a community, going against the globalizing tide. This
move was in part a reaction to a context where global connectivity was increasingly affordable
(thanks in part to the effort of groups like CUT), with the Internet being fast-molded into the macro-
economic structures of global capitalism. At a time when the Global Justice movement was gaining
traction  in  its  opposition  to  neoliberal  globalization,  Consume.net  reflected  a  similar  criticism,
seeking to embody a form of resistance to the growing commodification of the Internet by putting
emphasis on locality. The irony was that such initiative was made possible by a technical innovation
–  WiFi  –  produced  by  regulatory  decisions  made  by  an  international  and  corporate-friendly
organization  like  the  International  Telecommunications  Union,  and  first  made  available  to  the
general public with the launch of Apple’s Airport device.
Of  course,  Consume.net  was  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  local  community  networks  they  were
building  needed  to  be  connected  to  the  global  Internet  to  maintain  relevance.  Unlike  the
Independents of early telephone networks in the U.S., long-distance interconnection was a given,
and one which needed to be counter-balanced. Like for FDN, taking part in the global Internet was
costly. Sharing costs was a way of making it more affordable, and both FDN and Consume.net
understood that the more participants joined, the cheaper the community’s bandwidth would be. In
that  respect,  as  noted  by  MacKenzie  (2005),  Consumet.net  was  also  key  in  early  attempts  to
“engineer the connection of local networks into extensive ad hoc informal meshes of wireless nodes
across local and national boundaries” (p. 281). The joint effort took the form of the PicoPeering
Agreement  (PPA),  a  document  first  presented  in  2003  which  aimed  to  safeguard  the  values
promoted by Consume.net and the growing movement around wireless CNs. The first version of the
agreement opened on these lines:
“There are now many community networks, but they are separated geographically and socially
and do not form a coherent network. This document is an attempt to connect those network
islands by providing the minimum baseline template for a peering agreement between owners of
individual network nodes – the PicoPeering Agreement.
The PPA is a way of formalizing the interaction between two peers. Owners of network nodes
assert their right of ownership by declaring their willingness to donate the free exchange of
data across their networks” (PicoPeering Agreement v.1, 2003).
The PPA held the potential of creating a network of community networks that would represent “a
viable  and  competitive  supplement  to  the  internet,  but  one  where  the  system of  ownership  is
decentralized enough for it to remain a “common,” according to a volunteer involved in the project
(MacKenzie,  2005).  Again,  though the move from theory to  practice has  since been somewhat
disappointing, the original idea of a peering agreement that would allow local community networks
to federate at the local, regional and global levels lives up to this day. As De Filippi and Tréguer
write (2015), the PPA suggests “a new model for interconnection, one that blurs the distinction
between  the  backbone  and  the  last-mile  and  federates  networks  in  a  decentralized  manner,
extending  in  every  direction  and  potentially  spawning  over  whole  countries  and  even  across
borders.” Freifunk has used the PPA as its model license for federating the nodes composing its
network, both at the local and regional level, but also at the national scale. Another experiment of
this kind was carried on in 2012, when community networks FunkFeuer from Austria, NEDWirelles
from Croatia, and Wlan Slovenija established a wireless backbone spanning across geographical
borders to create a direct link between them (Musti, 2012). These experiments, pioneered in the
early 2000s, show that CNs can bring innovative techno-legal answers to the challenge of bridging
the local and global scale in connectivity needs.
3.3 Regulation and the Importance of Advocacy for the Sustainability of 
Community Networks
One  last  important  lesson  to  draw  from these  short  histories  of  FDN and  Consume  are  their
relationship to political institutions. 
FDN approached partner public institutions like RENATER who was operating France’s network
for academic and research institutions. Later, the deal was severed because RENATER decided that
FDN did not, in fact, qualify as an educational non-profit. The move coincided with the opening up
of the country’s telecom sector to market competition, which after a surge in the number of access
providers led to a progressive and fast-paced recentralization of the market. FDN established loose
connections with the emerging French digital rights scene in the second half of the nineties, which
proved important to frame the political importance of the lone French CN and motivate some of its
user to get involved in Free Software and Digital Rights advocacy efforts. However, at least until
the  late  2010’s,  FDN  never  really  established  a  strong  advocacy  capabilities  to  influence
increasingly  hostile  telecom  policies  to  make  room  for  alternative  networks  in  the  regulatory
landscape. Although policy favoring the unbundling of last-mile networks allowed FDN to upgrade
to ADSL technologies, the group played no role in pushing for such a policy and failed to organize
to protect these “open access” policies in the era of fiber-to-the-home networks. It was only when a
strong digital rights group emerged in France after 2009, and thanks to the launch of an actual CN
movement in France from 2011 on, that FDN started getting more involved in policy discussions,
both directly and indirectly (by sharing expertise with other groups), in particular around the issue
of Net neutrality. Although FDN has become an important figure in the French debate on civil rights
online (to the point of engaging in litigation against Internet surveillance policies, for instance), to
this day it has yet to organize a sustained and coherent political effort aimed at influencing telecom
regulation.
Consume.net was political from the start, but through a form of political engagement which did not
naturally push it to talk to policy-makers. The anarchist, oppositional ethos of its founders did not
predispose the group to reach out to the latter. However, it  was able to rely early on consumer
pressure groups, like the CUT campaign, to join advocacy efforts which had direct relevance to
them. A few months later, when British Telecom launched a lobbying effort aimed at outlawing the
broadcast  of WiFi  signals  across the public  realm,  Consume.net’s  volunteers  had the expertise,
resources and connection that helped them preempt such regulation.
Each of these two early CNs have their paradox. On the one hand, FDN offers a model of a CN
whose self-understanding has become rooted in civil rights discourse and a broad political agenda
around “Internet freedom” while remaining at a distance of policymaking in telecom regulation. On
the other, Consume.net rejected the human rights rhetorics (today, Stevens (2016) calls this line of
discourse is “American bullshit”),  but --with the help of other groups-- did not shy away from
campaigning on delimited telecom policy items to achieve significant change in regulations (e.g.
flat-rate pricing schemes). For contemporary CNs, there may be room for a third way, a middle
ground  where  a  pragmatic  discourse  on  human  rights  online  can  be  reconciled  with  effective
campaigning and engagement with telecom policy-makers. Freifunk seems to be a good example of
such middle ground, and FDN now seems to be moving in that direction as well. The history of CNs
therefore points  to  the importance of  alliance with advocacy and pressure groups as  a  way of
anchoring  CNs  in  a  political  movement  and  helping  them  develop  resource  for  political
mobilization. 
Finally, both examples suggest that one of the CNs remain highly dependent to market regulatory
and business developments. FDN’s rises and falls are closely linked to the (in)ability of traditional
business players in the telecom market to respond to connectivity needs, or to regulatory authorities’
support (or lack of thereof) for meaningful competition and diversity in telecom markets. The same
goes for Consume.net, who benefited from the opening up of WiFi frequencies and helped frame
the potential of WiFi to subvert part of the political economy of telecommunications. However,
within a few years, it would see the idea of free WiFi hotspots co-opted by restaurants, hotel chains
and telecom operators (with BT’s Openzone hotspots for instance) and the “self co-optation” of
those of its participants who went to to market their technical skills in the tech and telecom sectors.
As De Filippi and Tréguer write, in a sector where innovation is fast-paced, “[political] motives are
not in and of themselves sufficient for the network to scale up beyond a restrained community of
highly engaged individuals with strong ideological values.” In order to survive and grow, “these
community networks must also provide a service that is considered at least as good and preferably
better than that of mainstream ISPs” (2015, p. 4).
In sum, all of these challenges point to the overarching need for political organizing. Considering
the  collusion  and  corruption  that  plagues  telecom  policy,  Community  Networks  represent  an
instance of “insurgent citizenship” in the online public sphere of the online public sphere – one that
advances a  radically-democratic  agenda through the construction of  alternative communications
infrastructures  (Tréguer,  2015),  and a  strategic  locus  for  reinterpreting  both  ends of  traditional
“mediactivism” (Cardon & Granjon, 2010): the  critique that aims to empower individuals and
collectives to disseminate their own voices and find way to meet their specific communicational
needs by mastering the roll-out of alternative networks, and the counter-hegemonic critique that
tackle structural issues, using these alternative networks as a symbolic resource to ward off the
forms of domination and collusion that divert  telecommunications  and media policies from the
public interest.
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